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COMMENTS
EAsEMENTs-UsE OF BouNDARY-LINE DRIVEWAYS AS PERMISSIVE
OR ADVERSE-The essence of prescription as a means of acquiring
ownership or an interest is long-continued use. If the claimant's task
were simply the proof of the use and that it had been open, it would
not be a difficult one. The chief difficulties are encountered in establishing that the use had the necessary quality of adverseness. The like
requirement as to a possession that ripens into ownership under the
statute of limitations has its problems, but they are, generally speaking,
not so troublesome.1
It is easy to say that an "adverse" use in one that is not permissive,
that it is one made under "claim of right." As a definition such statement is accuratel but it leaves,the real difficulty to be faced: the deterrp.ination whether a use on proved facts was "not permissive" but
under "claim of right." It must be remembered that the latter phrase
1 In adverse possession one has the' more unequivocal fact of possession which is
normally continually visible. When it is said that an adverse possessor is one who "acts
like an owner" reference is made to outward manifestations much more expressive than
the usual acts of mere user.
·
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necessitates no "claim" in anything like the popular sense of the word
and, even more baffling, that a use may be "not permissive" though the
servient owner all the time knew of the use and suffered it to continue;
indeed, he may have literally assented to it.
' Only rarely in judicially approved cases of prescription does one
find anything like a positive or affirmative claim of right. Such claim
is almost always a deduction from the circumstances of the use, the most
potent factor being the fact that it was not permissive. A possession of
land under an ineffective attempt to convey it to the possessor, for
example, an oral gift, is adverse. Though the possession is taken with
the full assent of the attempted donor and is therefore in that sense
permissive, the important fact is that the possession does not continue
under such donor but in the supposed right of the occupant. So in the
case of prescription, a use that is pursuant to an ine:ffective attempt to
create an easement is adverse.2 On the other hand, use under a mere
license is permissive and no matter how long continued it will not support a prescriptive claim. The one making the use in such case is not
acting as owner of the right but in recognition of the paramount right
of the licensor.
The point of real difficulty, the turning point in these situations, is
in determining whether the arrangement which initiated the use is
more properly to be regarded as intended to be permanent, despite the
informality, or as a temporary accommodation. If the former, the use
should be classed as adverse; if the latter, as permissive.3
A common type of case presenting the question is the frequent
arrangement between nei&hbors for a common driveway, part on the
land of each. It may be an economy and in many instances a saving
of limited space to have such common driveway leading perhaps to
garages in the rear. Only occasionally will the parties' understanding
be put into such form as to meet the legal requirements for the creation
of cross-easements. Not infrequently considerable expense is incurred
in building the driveway and one or both of the neighbors may arrange
his or their premises in reliance upon the continued use of the way. So
long as friendly relations continue, no difficulty arises, but when, as
sometimes happens, such relations become strained, one party may con2 See, for example, Wortman v. Stafford, 217 Mich. 554, 187 N.W. 326 (1922);
Lechman v. Mills, 46 Wash. 624, 91 P. I I ( 1907).
3 In addition to the cases in the preceding note, see Gyra v. Windler, 40 Colo.
366, 91 P. 36 (1907); Alderman v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 137, 70 A. 626 (1908);
Sell v. Finke, 295 ill. 470, 129 N.E. 90 (1920); Robert v. Perron, 269 Mass. 537,
169 N.E. 489 (1930); Outhwaite v. Foote, 240 Mich. 327, 215 N.W. 331 (1927),
noted 26 MICH. L. REv. 453 (1928); Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 200, 125 P. 403
(1912); Texas & P. Ry. v. Scott, (C.C.A. 5th, 1896) 77 F. 726. The difficulties
have led to the formulation of presumptions, which, however, sharply vary. See 11
MICH. L. REV. 384 (1913).
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elude to block off the drive. Then the discommoded neighbor will
endeavor to establish an easement by prescription.
. A good example of this sort of neighborhood difficulty is found. in
a recent Illinois case.4 Adjoining owners, A and B, in r920, joined in
building a cinder drive between their houses leading from the street
to garages in the rear, the garages apparently being built following the
construction of the driveway, their location being determined, in part
at least, by the existence of the way. A year later, at A's suggestion,
each laid a cement walk, three and one-half feet wide, thus giving a.
hard surface driveway in place of the cinders. In r 92 5, A's lot was
conveyed to D, and the ownership of B's lot was acquired by p.
Common use of the driveway continued amicably until r942, when D
erected a fence down the middle of the way, there having been some
objection by Mrs. D to the way in which Mrs. P was driving her car
at the back end of the drive. This led to an action by P to restrain D
from obstructing the drivew11,y, P claiming an easement by prescription.
It appeared that after the trouble began D had provided access to his
garage from an alley in the rear. To get to and from P's garage would
require considerable readjustment of his premises, the landscaping, etc.,
having been done in reliance upon the availability of the cement driveway. The court denied P's claim to an easement by prescription, the
basis being that the long-continued use had been permissive, hence not
"adverse."
Such concepts as "adverse use" and "permissive use" are so ambiguous that surely in determining their meaning as applied to a particular fact situation one is warranted in giving weight to the desirability
of the conclusion that is indicated by the one or the other. As pointed
out in an earlier note in this Review,5 continuous travel over uncultivated, waste land may well be classified as permissive even though
precisely the same sort of travel over cultivated areas would be deemed
adverse. An agreement between neighbors for what was obviously
deemed a temporary use-by one of the land of another should not ripen
into an easement by use, and the result would be reached by classifying
such use as permissive. On the other hand, when neighbors effect an
arrangement, however informal, for uses of each other's land that bears
the 'earmarks of permanence and the use continues for the prescriptive
period, it seems a clearly sensible conclusion that an easement or mutual
easements result, and the user would be said to have been adverse.
Fairness and decency in conduct are furthered by such conclusion.6
Lang v. Dupuis, (Ill. 1943) 46 N.E. (2d) 21.
II MICH. L. REV. 384 (1913).
6 If two neighbors were to enter into an informal agreement for the erection of
a common wall on the dividing line, half on each lot, each one to have the right to use
the entire wall, and the wall were built and used accordingly for the prescriptive period,
4

5
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In reaching its conclusion the Illinois court felt that its course was
determined by a series of earlier decisions in that state.7 Those cases
proceeded on the familiar general proposition that "a verbal permission
to pass over the lands of another cannot ripen into a prescriptive right,
however long the permissive use is enjoyed." As pointed out above,
the problem is not so simple as such broad language indicates.8
The recent case of Johnson 'V. Whelan 9 presents a much more
sensible and realistic view. The facts there were essentially the same.
The court said:
"While it may be true, as contended by defendant, that mere
permissive use of a way over the lands of another, however long
indulged in, will not ripen into an easement, for the reason that
such use bears no element of adverse claim, yet we cannot agree
that in this case there was no adverse claim. Each owner, after the
driveway was paved, was by his use thereof asserting an adverse
right in the portion of the way lying on the other's land." 10
R.W.A.

surely good sense would dictate a conclusion, if possible under the law, that easements
had been created. Though the use in a very real sense had been permissive, it would
seem it ought to be classified as adverse.
7 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Stewart, 265 Ill. 35, 106 N.E. 512 (1914); Bentz v.
Stear, 285 Ill. 599, 121 N.E. 176 (1918); Baird v. Westberg, 341 Ill. 616, 173 N.E.
820 (1931).
8 On behalf of P it had also been argued that while the original arrangement may
have amounted only to a license, it should be concluded that the actions induced by
such permit, the change in position in reliance thereon, resulted in an irrevocable right,
in effect, an easement. This contention, too, was rejected.
9 171 Okla. 243 at 244, 42 P. (2d) 882 (1935).
10 In the annotation to this case in 98 A. L. R. 1098 (1935), many cases are
collected. In Thompson v. Schappert, 229 low;i. 360, 294 N.W. 580 (1940) the
court concluded that an easement arose out of a common use of a driveway located on
the boundary line on the ground that there had been acquiescence, the same sort of
acquiescence that, under the Iowa law, is effective to establish a boundary line in
accordance with occupancy.

